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Article 
Limiting Liberty to Prevent Obesity:  Justifiability of 
Strong Hard Paternalism in Public Health Regulation 
THADDEUS MASON POPE 
Because of the largely self-regarding nature of obesity, many current 
and proposed public health regulatory measures are paternalistic.  That is, 
these measures interfere with a person’s liberty with the primary goal of 
improving that person’s own welfare. 
Paternalistic public health measures may be effective in reducing 
obesity.  They may even be the only sufficiently effective type of regulation.  
But many commentators argue that paternalistic public health measures 
are not politically viable enough to get enacted.  After all, paternalism is 
repugnant in our individualistic culture.  It is “wrong” for the government 
to limit our liberty for our own good. 
In this Article, I argue that such pessimism is misplaced.  Defeatist and 
despairing commentators are working with an impoverished conceptual 
framework.  I offer a richer vocabulary.  By linking current debates in 
public health ethics to classic works in normative jurisprudence and the 
philosophy of law, I distinguish ethically distinct types of hard paternalism.  
Each has its own unique conditions for justifiability.  By focusing on these 
differences, I demonstrate that there are abundant opportunities for hard 
paternalistic regulatory measures to address obesity and other public 
health problems. 
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Limiting Liberty to Prevent Obesity:  Justifiability of 
Strong Hard Paternalism in Public Health Regulation 
THADDEUS MASON POPE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Obesity is a major public health problem.1  Fortunately, there is a wide 
range of regulatory efforts that federal, state, and local governments can 
take to address the problem.2  But because of the largely self-regarding 
nature of obesity, many of the current and proposed regulatory measures 
are paternalistic.3  That is, these measures may interfere with a person’s 
individual liberty with the goal of improving his welfare.4 
Will paternalistic regulatory measures be effective in reducing obesity?  
Are they politically viable enough to get enacted?  In Public Health 
Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, Professor Friedman is not 
optimistic that we can answer either of these two questions affirmatively.  
He argues that paternalism “has peaked” and “may have reached the 
                                                                                                                          
* Director of the Health Law Institute and Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University; 
Adjunct Professor, Australian Centre for Health Law Research, Queensland University of Technology; 
Adjunct Associate Professor, Albany Medical College.   
1 David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, 46 CONN. L. 
REV. 1687, 1711–14 (2014). 
2 Public health law experts identify seven distinct types of legal tools that regulators can use to 
promote public health: (1) taxation and spending; (2) altering the information environment (e.g., 
labeling, advertising); (3) altering the built environment (e.g., zoning to encourage physical activity); 
(4) altering the socioeconomic environment; (5) direct regulation; (6) deregulation; and (7) tort 
liability.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 35–40 
(2000) (discussing public health regulation through taxation and spending); World Health Org., 
European Charter on Counteracting Obesity, EUR/06/5062700/8 (Nov. 16, 2006) (noting that it should 
be a priority to provide affordable, healthy choices to lower socioeconomic population groups); Julie 
Ralston Aoki et al., Beyond the Code Book: Legal Tools for Accelerating Progress in Obesity 
Prevention, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 61, 61–65 (2013) (pointing out the possibility of tort liability as a 
way to promote public health); James G. Hodge et al., New Frontiers in Obesity Control: Innovative 
Public Health Interventions, 5 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 1–2 (2013) (noting that altering the 
built environment and altering the information environment are two reforms considered by regulators); 
Robert MacCoun et al., Assessing Alternative Drug Control Regimes, 15 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 
330, 331–38 (1996) (discussing different types of drug control regimes ranging from prohibition to 
deregulation); Bryan Thomas & Lawrence O. Gostin, Tackling the NCD Crisis: Innovations in Law 
and Governance, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 16, 19–21 (2013) (providing governmental strategies for 
addressing non-communicable diseases). 
3 See generally Friedman, supra note 1, Part III.B.2. 
4 See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws: The Definition of Hard 
Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 660 (2004) (“Paternalism is the restriction of a subject’s self-
regarding conduct for the good of that same subject.”).   
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natural limits of effectiveness.”5  Specifically, Friedman contends that 
paternalistic regulatory measures to address obesity suffer from two types 
of material limitations: efficacy problems and practicality problems.6   
Friedman’s argument proceeds in two stages.  First, he argues that soft 
paternalistic measures are not sufficiently efficacious.7  These measures, 
which alter the decision-making environment, yet do not wholly eliminate 
unhealthy choices, are usually too weak to adequately address the obesity 
problem.8  They are insufficient to overcome human biases and change 
personal behavior.9  Friedman contends that hard paternalistic measures 
are needed that ban the unhealthy choices and make them impossible.10   
In the second stage of his argument, Friedman argues that we cannot 
have what we need.11  Having already established the necessity for hard 
paternalism, Friedman argues that it is impractical because hard 
paternalism is too socially unpalatable to deploy.12  It has, Friedman 
explains, “reached natural limits in terms of popular viability.”13   
I am more optimistic than Friedman.  The Rolling Stones may be right 
that “you can’t always get what you want.”14  But they are also right that 
“if you try sometime you find you get what you need.”15  This will be my 
overarching theme: We can get the hard paternalism that we need.  For the 
sake of argument, I will accept Friedman’s contention that only hard 
paternalistic measures are sufficient to adequately address the obesity 
problem.16  I focus this responsive commentary on disputing the second 
part of Friedman’s argument that hard paternalism is impractical and 
unacceptable.   
Friedman contends that we cannot get the hard paternalism that we 
need.17  But he fails to distinguish materially different types of hard 
paternalism.  Admittedly, the public has rejected, and will continue to 
                                                                                                                          
5 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1693–94. 
6 See id. (“[F]inding viable opportunities to change consumption and physical activity patterns 
through hard paternalism proves difficult, and soft paternalism can prove ineffective.”). 
7 Id. at 1694. 
8 Id. at 1701–03, 1768–69. 
9 Id. at 1768. 
10 Id. at 1769. 
11 See id. at 1694 (“Paternalism has peaked, for now, in the realm of public health regulation.”). 
12 Id. at 1767–68.  
13 Id. at 1710. 
14 THE ROLLING STONES, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, on LET IT BLEED (London 
Records 1969). 
15 Id.   
16 While I do not have space here to review the empirical research, this claim seems more than 
plausible.  See, e.g., One in Three in the UK Can’t Afford to Eat Healthily, NUFFIELD HEALTH (Jan. 14, 
2014), http://www.nuffieldhealth.com/fitness-and-wellbeing/news/One-in-three-in-the-UK-cant-afford-
to-eat-healthily (finding twenty percent of obese people surveyed “would rather be overweight than 
watch what they eat”). 
17 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1767. 
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reject, many types of hard paternalistic regulation.18  But they have not 
rejected all types of hard paternalism.19  My primary objective in this 
Article is to draw some conceptual distinctions that light the path forward 
for justifiable hard paternalistic measures to address obesity. 
In Part II, I summarize Friedman’s argument regarding the necessity, 
yet impracticality, of hard paternalism.  Then in Parts III and IV, I draw 
two sets of distinctions that help distinguish practical hard paternalism 
from impractical hard paternalism.   
In Part III, I distinguish “weak” hard paternalism from “strong” hard 
paternalism.  Friedman uses “hard paternalism” to focus on the degree of 
liberty interference.20  He fails to consider the reason or motivation for the 
interference.  By attending to this dimension, it becomes clear that the 
range of potentially practical and efficacious hard paternalism is actually 
broader than what Friedman concludes is viable.     
Finally, in Part IV, I make two arguments for the justifiability of hard 
paternalism.  First, weak hard paternalism is almost always justified 
because it entails only the restriction of conduct that is not substantially 
voluntary.  Second, even strong hard paternalism is sometimes justified; 
while restricting an individual’s self-regarding, substantially voluntary 
conduct is rarely justified, it can be under certain circumstances.  Strong 
hard paternalism therefore should not be categorically dismissed as 
impractical and unacceptable.  I defend seven conditions under which hard 
paternalistic public health measures are justified. 
I conclude that Friedman is too pessimistic and parsimonious.  He 
thinks that there is only a smattering of opportunities for hard paternalism 
to address obesity.  By distinguishing ethically distinct types of hard 
paternalism, I demonstrate that there are abundant opportunities for hard 
paternalistic regulatory measures to address obesity and other public health 
problems.  
II.  SUMMARY OF FRIEDMAN’S ARGUMENT  
Friedman argues that public health regulators are in a no-win situation.  
They can make material progress on attacking difficult problems like 
obesity only by using hard paternalistic interventions.21  But hard 
paternalistic interventions are not politically viable.22  So, regulators are in 
                                                                                                                          
18 See id. at 1692 (concluding, based on the examples of marijuana legalization, fluoridation, and 
genetically modified foods, that the public has definitely rejected “visible, hard paternalism”). 
19 See id. at 1709 (suggesting that hidden hard paternalism may still be a viable option for 
regulating the public’s behavior and choices).  
20 See id. at 1694–95 (adopting Gerald Dworkin’s definition of paternalism). 
21 See id. at 1743–53 (stating that hard paternalism is difficult to implement, but that the 
alternative of soft paternalism is a weaker regulatory force). 
22 See id. at 1767 (arguing that the public’s negative reaction to deprivations of autonomy makes 
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a “bind.”23  Paternalistic intervention “present[s] tradeoffs in terms of ease 
[of intervention] and effectiveness.”24  What is acceptable does not work.  
And what works is not acceptable.  
I will unpack and explicate Friedman’s argument in three stages.  First, 
I clarify his terminology, distinguishing his use of soft paternalism and 
hard paternalism.  Second, I explain his two-part contention—that hard 
paternalism is necessary to address obesity, yet impractical.  Third, I 
discuss a small window of opportunity that Friedman leaves open for hard 
paternalism: two exceptions to his “rule” of impracticality.   
A.  Soft Paternalism and Hard Paternalism 
By “soft paternalism,” Friedman means regulatory measures that 
(a) attempt to improve individual welfare by altering the decision-making 
environment to lead people to make better choices, yet (b) do not wholly 
eliminate the unhealthy choices.25  In other words, soft paternalistic 
measures enhance decision making while preserving individual autonomy 
and discretion.26   
Friedman rightly observes that soft paternalism can be more or less 
interventional.27  He maps out three tiers of soft paternalistic intervention.28  
First, starting at the low end of the spectrum, the government may provide 
raw factual information to consumers.29  For example, the Food and Drug 
Administration mandates nutrition labeling on food packages.30  This helps 
people make more informed purchasing and consumption decisions.   
Second, the government might offer “truthful narratives” to illustrate 
the risks from certain choices.31  These concrete instances of harm can be 
more effective than simple informational disclosures.32  Vivid and 
entertaining examples are more cognitively and emotionally compelling.33  
                                                                                                                          
hard paternalistic interventions difficult to implement). 
23 Id. at 1769.  
24 Id. at 1726. 
25 Id. at 1696 n.38, 1701.  
26 Id.  
27 See id. at 1698–99 (providing examples of the varying degrees of intervention and defining a 
spectrum of paternalistic interventionism). 
28 Id.; see also Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 
199–202, 210, 215, 225–27 (2006) (arguing that raw factual information should be given to consumers, 
the government should offer truthful narratives, and insulating strategies might sometimes be 
appropriate). 
29 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1698, 1701–03. 
30 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–101.108 (2013). 
31 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1699, 1703–05. 
32 See id. at 1735, 1737 (providing an example of a movie that impacted young adults’ attitudes 
toward fast food, but noting that “these delivery mechanisms for new and different types of narratives 
have yet to be exploited”).   
33 See id. at 1703–04 (discussing the theory behind and examples of strong-form debiasing in the 
contexts of smoking and overconsumption of fast food). 
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For example, a recent Georgia advertisement campaign featured stark 
billboards and television commercials featuring sad, overweight children.34  
These images were designed “to shock families into recognizing that 
obesity is a problem.”35 
Third, in the hardest soft paternalistic regulation, the government 
might require certain “insulating strategies.”36  These conditional mandates 
impose certain restrictions on activities to make them safer and to insulate 
participants from harm.  The classic examples are traffic laws mandating 
the use of automobile seatbelts and motorcycle helmets.37  These 
regulations require use of a safety device.  But, like all soft paternalistic 
measures, they still preserve the individual’s choice to engage in the “core 
activity.”38  Similarly, while sin taxes may be coercive,39 they do not 
wholly eliminate the choice, for example, to smoke or to drink soda.40 
In contrast to soft paternalism, hard paternalism entails “outright 
bans.”41  By “hard paternalism,” Friedman means regulatory measures that 
attempt to improve individual welfare by eliminating some choices and 
making them impossible.42  In other words, hard paternalistic measures 
enhance decision making by removing autonomy and discretion.43  They 
“completely substitute the regulator’s judgment for that of the 
consumer.”44        
For example, contrast tobacco and marijuana.  Government regulators 
                                                                                                                          
34 See Carrie Teegardin, Grim Childhood Obesity Ads Stir Critics, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 29, 
2011, at 1A (reporting that some people did not approve of an Atlanta hospital’s blunt advertising 
campaign against childhood obesity). 
35 Kathy Lohr, Controversy Swirls Around Harsh Anti-Obesity Ads, NPR (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/09/144799538/controversy-swirls-around-harsh-anti-obesity-ads. 
36 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1699, 1705–07. 
37 See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The Ethics of 
Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 435–38 (2000) (providing a history of the laws 
regarding automobile seatbelts and motorcycle helmets in terms of the gradual acceptance of 
paternalism in those areas). 
38 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1705.  What constitutes the core activity is hardly an uncontroversial 
claim.  See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 122–23, 129, 
276–77, 282, 294, 304–05 (1986) (providing examples from criminal law concerning deceit, 
voluntariness, consent, and false pretense where alternative interpretations and perspectives of an act 
may lead to different outcomes); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and 
Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1858 (2013) (noting the difficulty of “identify[ing] the level of 
generality at which people’s ends are to be described”).  See generally CARL GINET, ON ACTION 45–71 
(1990) (discussing key literature on individuation). 
39 See FEINBERG, supra note 38, at 23–25. 
40 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1706–07 (explaining that with taxation the choice to smoke or 
drink “has merely been impeded by compelling the consumer to internalize the social cost of 
consumption”). 
41 Id. at 1699. 
42 Id. at 1696 n.38, 1699, 1707. 
43 Id. at 1696 n.38. 
44 Id. at 1701. 
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impose all sorts of soft paternalistic measures to reduce tobacco use; the 
packaging is labeled with the health risks45 and advertisement campaigns 
feature diseased and disfigured former smokers.46  And tobacco products 
are subject to significant excise taxes.47  But tobacco is still readily 
available, and millions continue to smoke.48  In contrast, when it comes to 
marijuana and other recreational drugs, regulators do not stop at soft 
paternalism—these products are categorically banned.49    
B.  The Necessity, Yet Impracticality, of Hard Paternalism 
Once we understand Friedman’s vocabulary, grasping his argument is 
straightforward.  Friedman argues that anything less than a “full-court 
press” against obesity will likely result in only “minimal returns.”50  
Nutritional disclosures and other soft paternalistic measures have proven 
only mildly effective.51  They just do not have enough “power” to put 
“significant dents” in the obesity problem.52  Only with hard paternalistic 
regulatory measures can we change the eating and drinking habits of 
hundreds of millions of people. 
But we cannot have the hard paternalism that we need.  Friedman 
argues that in a “full-court press,” regulators will encounter “political 
resistance to paternalistic endeavors.”53  There are, he contends, “limits to 
the types and degrees of regulatory intervention that the public” accepts.54  
We need hard paternalism to change the way people behave when they eat 
and drink.  But the public generally rejects hard paternalism.55  Its 
                                                                                                                          
45 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).  
46 See Tips from Former Smokers, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 3, 
2014), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/campaign/tips/resources/videos (describing the individuals featured 
on campaign advertisements who lost limbs, hair, and teeth due to smoking). 
47 See State Cigarette Excise Taxes: 2011 and 2012, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 25, 
2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/2011-state-cigarette-excise-taxes.aspx (showing the tax on 
cigarettes in each state). 
48 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING—50 
YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 703 (2014), available at 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/50-years-of-progress/full-report.pdf (explaining that 
despite progress being made in the United States, there is still “persistence of high prevalence of 
tobacco use among segments of the population”). 
49 Marijuana Resource Center: State Laws Related to Marijuana, OFF. NAT’L DRUG CONTROL 
POL’Y (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/state-laws-related-to-marijuana.  
50 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1719. 
51 Id. at 1731.  
52 Id. at 1769. 
53 Id. at 1719.  “A full effort or total war on obesity would run into two distinct categories of 
obstacles: (1) hostility toward paternalism; and (2) the complexity of the problem . . . .”  Id. at 1767. 
54 Id. at 1691. 
55 Id.  
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“appetite for hard paternalism . . . can be uneasy.”56  Friedman is hardly 
alone in this assessment.57 
Accordingly, if regulators prudently targeted their resources and 
focused on those strategies that the “public will support, or at least not 
aggressively oppose,” then they would focus on soft paternalistic 
measures.58  They would eschew hard paternalistic strategies.59  But those 
are precisely the sorts of efforts that are needed to effectively combat 
obesity.  Soft paternalism is practical but inefficacious.  Hard paternalism 
is efficacious but impractical.   
C.  Small Window for Hard Paternalism 
But all is not lost.  Friedman argues that “hard paternalism can still be 
deployed effectively under the right circumstances.”60  There may be 
“spots” where hard paternalism can provide opportunities for high impact 
interventions.61   
Friedman argues that there are two such “spots” for hard paternalism.  
First, he argues that hard paternalism can work “[i]f the zone of the 
regulation already falls within natural control of the regulator.”62  Second, 
                                                                                                                          
56 Id. at 1720.  “[T]he public attitude toward paternalism in contexts involving private 
consumption . . . may be trending negative.”  Id. at 1744.  “Hard paternalism may prove difficult to 
implement . . . because of the public’s reaction to the complete deprivation of autonomy.”  Id. at 1753.  
Friedman bolsters this argument by looking to marijuana, fluoride, and GMOs.  See id. Part III.C (using 
regulation marijuana and fluoridation as examples of the political resistance to hard paternalism and 
GMOs as an example of the expansion of choice by regulators). 
57 See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 2, at 497 (“[A] person’s decision about what to eat . . . affects 
only him- or herself, so many do not see government intervention as justifiable.”); PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., PUBLIC AGREES ON OBESITY’S IMPACT, NOT GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 1–2 (2013) (presenting 
statistics on the public’s opposition to government regulation as a way to combat American obesity); 
Aoki et al., supra note 2, at 62 (describing the concerns that decision makers may have with vending or 
supplier contracts that promote healthy options because they are focused on immediate budget concerns 
instead of long term health benefits); Lawrence O. Gostin, Limiting What We Can Eat: A Bridge Too 
Far?, 92 MILBANK Q. 173, 173 (2014) (noting that the public is comfortable with the government 
controlling other sectors, such as the economy or infectious diseases, but “often draws a line at limiting 
dietary choices”); Rick Mayes & Thomas R. Oliver, Chronic Disease and the Shifting Focus of Public 
Health: Is Prevention Still a Political Lightweight?, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 181, 185–86 (2012) 
(arguing that it is difficult to advocate, from a political perspective, for the imposition of immediate 
burdens in exchange for uncertain, long-term benefits); Thomas & Gostin, supra note 2, at 17 
(“[P]revention strategies often have a whiff of paternalism, and this can be a distinct political 
liability.”). 
58 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1720 (“The political feasibility of disclosure may indeed tempt 
policymakers.  But many are still skeptical about whether this easier form of regulation . . . will prove 
effective.”); see also PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 57, at 5 (“[V]iews on what government should 
do are closely linked to perceptions of what the government can do.”). 
59 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1692, 1767–68 (describing the public’s uneasiness and general 
dislike for hard paternalism). 
60 Id. at 1744. 
61  Id. at 1753. 
62 Id. 
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Friedman contends that hard paternalistic measures might be acceptable if 
they are inoffensive.63  I will focus on this second opportunity for hard 
paternalism. 
Even though outright bans eliminate choice, the public may experience 
no “perception of loss.”64  Friedman provides two main examples: the 
banning of lead paint and the banning of trans-fats.65  In both cases the 
bans were implemented with “little protest or notice.”66  Friedman argues 
that these hard paternalistic measures were accepted by the public because 
they did not “visibly reduce choice.”67  The public was “shield[ed]” from 
the autonomy deprivation.68  They accepted these hard paternalistic 
measures because they were “hidden” bans.69   
But Friedman argues that this “hidden paternalism” exception is 
narrow.70  He explains, “[T]he opportunities for deploying paternalism 
effectively in the public health arena may prove limited.”71  It is difficult to 
identify food restrictions that prove “intangible or negligibly detectible.”72  
People may not mind the absence of trans-fats, but they certainly noticed 
New York Mayor Bloomberg’s ban on sugary drinks larger than sixteen 
ounces.73   
Friedman is probably correct that “regulators can intervene somewhat 
more easily . . . [if] their paternalistic presence is not felt.”74  But he is 
equally correct that people are unlikely to disregard or ignore most hard 
paternalistic regulatory measures aimed at combatting obesity.75  In short, 
it may be quite a challenge to find “hidden paternalism” opportunities 
where regulators can eliminate unhealthy choices without people noticing. 
In sum, Friedman has carved out two narrow instances where hard 
                                                                                                                          
63 Id. at 1747–51. 
64 Id. at 1747.  
65 Id. at 1707–09. 
66 Id. at 1709. 
67 Id. (emphasis added).  Again, this is a potential individuation problem because it could be 
described as a soft paternalistic insulting measure.  See id. (“When a paternalistic move does not visibly 
reduce choice but enhances individual welfare, the ban may prove to be a practical and effective 
prescription for a problem, even if a narrow one.”). 
68 Id. at 1737–38.  
69 Id. at 1709, 1749.  
70 Id. at 1709. 
71 Id. at 1769.  
72 Id. at 1747.  
73 See id. at 1690 (noting that a “broad segment of the population objected” to the ban); see also 
Kara Marcello, Note, The New York City Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Portion Cap Rule: Lawfully 
Regulating Public Enemy Number One in the Obesity Epidemic, 46 CONN. L. REV. 807, 851 (2013) 
(noting that a poll conducted prior to the ban’s passage found that six out of ten New York City 
residents opposed it). 
74 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1747. 
75 See id. (noting that redesigning the SNAP subsidy “to directly displace bad choices like soda 
would . . . generate an outcry that is reminiscent of the Big Gulp ban”). 
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paternalism might be practical.  Are they enough?  Even Friedman himself 
concludes that they probably are not.76  But, as I will argue below in Part 
IV, there are further situations in which hard paternalistic measures to 
combat obesity are practical. 
III.  VOCABULARY OF PATERNALISM 
Unfortunately, contemporary legal and philosophical literature on 
paternalism employs a different vocabulary than the literature of the 
preceding three decades.  Confusingly, today’s writers in normative 
jurisprudence and public health ethics are using many of the same terms 
that were used by writers in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.  But they are 
using those terms to mean different things. 
For example, while Friedman claims to “adopt Gerald Dworkin’s . . . 
definition of paternalism,” he does not.77  In distinguishing “hard” and 
“soft” paternalism, Friedman focuses on the type or manner of the 
intervention.  For Friedman, the difference between “hard” and “soft” 
paternalism depends on the amount of liberty restricted.78 
In contrast, Dworkin, like most philosophers and public health ethicists 
during the last third of the twentieth century, distinguishes “hard” and 
“soft” paternalism by instead focusing on the motivation or reason for the 
intervention.79  On this ground we can distinguish three separate liberty 
limiting principles: the harm principle, weak paternalism, and strong 
paternalism. 
A.  Harm Principle 
Friedman rightly observes that “in addition to concerns about 
individual health, the external costs of obesity are pressing.”80  Indeed, in 
2008, estimated health care costs related to obesity were $147 billion.81  By 
2030, medical costs associated with obesity are expected to increase by at 
least $48 billion annually, with the annual loss in economic productivity 
totaling $390 billion to $580 billion.82 
Friedman notes that these significant negative externalities may 
                                                                                                                          
76 See id. at 1693–94 (“[V]iable opportunities to change consumption and physical activity 
patterns through hard paternalism proves difficult, and soft paternalism can prove ineffective.”). 
77 Id. at 1694.  Friedman recognizes that various definitions of “hard paternalism” and “soft 
paternalism” are in circulation.  Id. at 1694 n.38. 
78 Id. at 1696–97.   
79 See Pope, supra note 4, at 678–79 (discussing the role of motivation in soft paternalism).   
80 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1714. 
81 Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payer-and Service-
Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFF. w822, w828 (2009). 
82 TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, F AS IN FAT: HOW OBESITY THREATENS AMERICA’S FUTURE 
28 (2012). 
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“render[] the label of paternalism less pejorative.”83  That is a huge 
understatement.  If the primary motivation for liberty limitation (whether 
of Friedman’s soft or hard variety) is to prevent harm to others, then the 
regulation is not paternalistic at all.84  It would, instead, be ethically 
grounded on the harm principle.    
The harm principle, or prevention of harm to others, has traditionally 
been recognized as having the greatest moral legitimacy of all liberty-
limiting principles, because preventing or reducing harm to others is a 
classic and core function of government and a traditional exercise of police 
power.85  Liberty limitation on this ground is publicly accepted.86   
Public health regulators seem to have more than enough data to 
credibly defend even total bans on the basis of preventing harm to others or 
harm to society.  So, it is worth noting that while government interference 
with the eating and drinking decisions of individuals might look 
paternalistic, it need not be defended or perceived as paternalistic.  To the 
extent that the harm principle can be plausibly invoked, public health 
regulators can avoid hard paternalism’s efficacy-practicality bind.87   
B.  Weak Paternalism 
While the harm principle is infinitely malleable, at some point the 
negative externalities become too small and distant to credibly ground 
liberty limitation on the basis of harm to others.  Therefore, some public 
health regulation will be paternalistic. 
But not all paternalism (not even all soft and hard paternalism) has the 
same ethical and moral status.  One must look not only to the degree of 
intervention (which distinguishes hard and soft paternalism) but also to the 
reason for the intervention.  Paternalism is most justified on the basis that 
the individual lacks the requisite decision-making capacity.  
This “weak paternalism” justifies intervention on the basis that the 
individual has assumed a risk without adequate information, without 
sufficient maturity, or without adequate freedom from coercion.  The 
classic example, from John Stuart Mill, is detaining someone who is about 
                                                                                                                          
83 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1714.  He later asks “whether regulators should be concerned with 
the aggregate social problem as opposed to individual personal choice.”  Id. at 1727. 
84 See Sunstein, supra note 38, at 1863 (noting that it is possible to justify governmental 
limitations without reference to paternalistic considerations). 
85 See Pope, supra note 37, at 428. 
86 See Eric Crampton et al., The Cost of Cost Studies 7–9 (Dept. of Econ. & Fin., Col. of Bus. & 
Econ., Univ. of Canterbury, Working Paper No. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/1129.pdf (noting policymaker-driven harm 
reduction in the context of alcohol abuse). 
87 Thaddeus M. Pope, The Slow Transition of U.S. Law Toward a Greater Emphasis on 
Prevention, in PREVENTION VS. TREATMENT: WHAT’S THE RIGHT BALANCE? 223 (Halley S. Faust & 
Paul T. Menzel eds., 2012). 
 2014] LIMITING LIBERTY TO PREVENT OBESITY 1871 
to unknowingly cross a dilapidated, dangerous bridge.88   
Under these circumstances it cannot fairly be said that the individual 
was free or autonomous in the first place because she did not understand 
what she was doing.89  Therefore, restricting the individual’s liberty does 
not impinge her autonomy.  For these reasons, weak and strong 
paternalistic measures combatting obesity have met with “positive” 
responses.90 
C.  Strong Paternalism 
While weak paternalism overrides an individual’s choices because they 
are not informed or voluntary, “strong” paternalism overrides choices even 
when they are informed and voluntary.91   
Strong paternalism is the position that it is morally justifiable to protect 
adults, against their will, from the harmful consequences of their choices, 
even when those choices are informed and voluntary and do not harm 
others.92  Thus, hard paternalism holds that autonomy can be trumped by 
beneficence.  The welfare of an individual can outweigh her right to self-
determination.93  
IV.  JUSTIFIABILITY OF HARD PATERNALISTIC  
PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION 
When Friedman concludes that hard paternalism is impractical and 
unacceptable, he seems to assume that hard paternalism is necessarily 
strong.  This is wrong on two counts.  First, hard paternalism can be weak 
and, therefore, well-justified.  Second, even strong hard paternalism is 
justified under some conditions. 
                                                                                                                          
88 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS 1, 123 
(John M. Robson ed., 1966) (“[T]hey might seize him and turn him back without any real infringement 
of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the 
river.”). 
89 Pope, supra note 37, at 430. 
90 See Hodge et al., supra note 2, at 36–37 (noting that mostly positive responses followed 
restriction of soda in public schools); cf. Bijan Fateh-Moghadam & Thomas Gutmann, Governing 
[through] Autonomy.  The Moral and Legal Limits of “Soft Paternalism,” 17 ETHICAL THEORY & 
MORAL PRAC. 383 (2014) (providing a critique of paternalism generally). 
91 See Pope, supra note 4, at 717 (describing the elements of hard paternalism, which include “the 
agent disregard[ing] the subject’s contemporaneous preferences”); Pope, supra note 37, at 430 
(“‘[H]ard’ or ‘strong’ paternalism . . . constrains individuals’ decisions even when those decisions are 
informed and voluntary.” (footnote omitted)). 
92 See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism Really Never Justified? A Response to 
Joel Feinberg, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 121, 123 (2005) (defining hard paternalism).   
93 See Pope, supra note 4, at 683–84 (“[T]he agent must limit the subject’s liberty primarily 
because she believes that intervention will contribute to the subject’s welfare . . . [and] the agent’s 
benevolent motive must be independent from the subject’s contemporaneous preferences.”).   
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A.  Weak Hard Paternalism 
Weak paternalism is usually soft paternalism.  If decision making is 
distorted by ignorance and biases, then the most appropriate regulation is 
that designed to correct for the informational deficits and biases.94  Indeed, 
the substantial overlap between weak and soft paternalism probably 
explains why the public accepts soft paternalism.95  They accept it not 
because it is soft, but because it is weak.  
While weak paternalism is usually soft, it is sometimes hard.  The 
classic example is public health regulation for the protection of children.  
Contrast the new IRS excise tax on tanning beds96 with state bans on 
minors using indoor tanning.97  The excise tax is soft paternalism, because 
it leaves the individual free to choose indoor tanning.  The total ban is hard 
paternalism, because it completely removes the option.  But since these 
bans are directed only at minors (who are presumed unable to make 
substantially voluntary decisions), the hard paternalism is weak.   
In short, a significant range of hard paternalism is weak.  And weak 
paternalism is almost always justified and acceptable.98  So, by 
distinguishing weak from strong hard paternalism, we find already that the 
opportunities for hard paternalistic public health regulation are not as 
meager as Friedman concludes they are.  
B.  Strong Hard Paternalism 
While Friedman does not distinguish between weak and strong hard 
paternalism, he seems to assume that hard paternalism is necessarily 
strong.  On this assumption, he concedes that strong hard paternalism is 
sometimes justified and acceptable.99  He focuses on the situation in which 
“[t]he forgone autonomy is invisible or simply has no value.”100  In this 
section, I argue that strong hard paternalism may be ethically and 
politically acceptable apart from when it is just “stealthy in 
implementation.”101 
                                                                                                                          
94 Recognize that under such regulations consumers are not only “free to choose” but “more 
equipped” to make accurate decisions.  Id. at 1730. 
95 See id. at 1733 (noting that “the positive reaction to the soft paternalism of mandatory calorie 
disclosure has not been overwhelmed by any noticeable popular backlash”).   
96 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10907, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000B (2012)); 26 C.F.R. § 49.5000B–1T (2013). 
97 Indoor Tanning Restrictions for Minors—A State-by-State Comparison, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/indoor-tanning-restrictions.aspx (last updated Feb. 
2014). 
98 See Pope, supra note 92, at 122–23 (“[S]oft paternalistic regulation actually helps to protect and 
promote [autonomy] by ensuring that an individual’s choices reflect her true preferences.”).  
99 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1697, 1709.  
100 Id. at 1709. 
101 Id.  
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I argue that strong hard paternalistic liberty limitation (SHP) is 
justified when: (1) there is strong evidence that each of the following six 
conditions is satisfied; (2) the objective of the SHP is to protect the subject 
from significant harm; (3) the subject has either a low autonomy interest or 
an irrational high autonomy interest in the restricted conduct; (4) the SHP 
is imposed only if no morally preferable, less autonomy restrictive 
alternatives are available; (5) the SHP has a high probability of 
success/effectiveness; (6) the harms from which the SHP protects the 
subject outweigh any harm caused by the SHP intervention itself; and (7) 
the SHP is designed to be as least restrictive as necessary.102 
1.  There Must Be Strong Evidence that These Conditions Are Satisfied 
The first necessary condition for justified strong hard paternalism 
requires that the regulator limit the subject’s liberty only where it has 
strong evidence that the other six conditions are satisfied.  As with any 
liberty limitation, there is a presumption against strong hard paternalism.103  
The regulator’s burden to overcome this presumption applies not only to 
the cogency of the reasons for the interference but also to the evidentiary 
basis for believing that those reasons are applicable.104   
In short, because the stakes (the restriction of substantially voluntary 
self-regarding conduct) are so high and because we are very interested in 
avoiding mistakes, the regulator must have high confidence and a reliable 
basis that the following conditions are satisfied. 
2.  Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Have the 
Objective of Protecting the Subject from Significant Harm 
The second necessary condition for justified strong hard paternalism 
requires that the regulator limit the subject’s liberty only in order to protect 
the subject from significant harm.  The severity and magnitude of harm 
surely factors into the justifiability of hard paternalism.  If it is too low, 
then it is just not worth interfering with the subject’s liberty.   
Only where the harm at issue is significant are the stakes high enough 
to warrant (and outweigh) the intrusion on the subject’s autonomy.105  This 
                                                                                                                          
102 See Thaddeus M. Pope, A Definition and Defense of Hard Paternalism: A Conceptual and 
Normative Analysis of the Restriction of Substantially Autonomous Self-Regarding Conduct 299–400 
(June 10, 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1087383 (expanding on and defending each of the 
listed conditions); see also James F. Childress & Ruth Gaare Bernheim, Beyond the Liberal and 
Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vision for Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1191, 1202–06 
(2003) (offering six similar conditions). 
103 See Pope, supra note 4, at 663–67 (discussing the “presumption of noninterference with 
individual liberty”). 
104 See Pope, supra note 102, at 299–309 (collecting authority). 
105 See id. at 309–33 (collecting authority).  
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entails two corollaries.  First, only “negative” strong hard paternalism 
(avoiding harm) is justifiable.106  As Friedman himself observes, cases of 
“positive” strong hard paternalism (conferring a benefit), such as forcing 
couch potatoes to live more active lifestyles, are not justified.107  Second, 
the harm at stake must constitute a significant setback to the subject’s 
critical interests (our more permanent, central, or life-defining projects) or 
welfare interests (physical health and vision, integrity, and normal 
functioning of one’s body).108  
3.  Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Restrict Only 
That Conduct in Which the Subject Has a Low Autonomy Interest 
While the second condition focuses on the content of the beneficence 
side of the equation (i.e., which interests of the subject are impacted and by 
how much are they impacted by the consequences of her conduct), the 
third condition focuses on the autonomy side of the equation (i.e., what 
interests does the subject have in the conduct that the regulator aims to 
restrict).109 
The third necessary condition for justified strong hard paternalism 
requires that the subject have a low autonomy interest in the restricted 
conduct.110  Most people do not engage unhealthy behaviors such as poor 
diet or unbuckled driving out of any deep and settled convictions as to 
what is valuable for them.  Consequently, restricting such conduct only 
trivially disrespects their autonomy.111   
4.  Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Be Imposed 
Only Where No Morally Preferable, Less Autonomy Restrictive 
Alternatives Are Available 
The fourth necessary condition for justified strong hard paternalism 
requires that it be a “last resort,” the only available liberty limiting 
principle which the regulator can use to protect the subject from significant 
harm.112 
                                                                                                                          
106 See id. at 312–20 (collecting authority). 
107 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1752 (noting that such “mandated behavior will likely prove 
impractical, even when directed against a serious contributor to a health problem” such as obesity). 
108 See Pope, supra note 102, at 320–34 (noting that hard paternalism can be justified where it is 
beyond “a minimum threshold of necessity” and the subject’s interest is “setback to a consequential 
degree”). 
109 Cf. SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 150–52 
(2013) (“Interference is justified on paternalistic grounds only when it reflects individuals’ actual 
values, not the values we might like them to have.”). 
110 Pope, supra note 102, at 333–35. 
111 In contrast, this condition may not be satisfied by strong paternalism that bans religiously 
motivated body piercing or mountain climbing.  See id. at 347–48 (noting the difference between the 
impact on liberty between regulation of these activities and cigarette smoking). 
112 Id. at 368. 
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As compared to soft paternalism and weak hard paternalism, strong 
paternalism is the most morally troubling.  Accordingly, we must be sure 
that we really need it before we use it.  If the regulatory desired ends can 
be accomplished in a way that avoids conflict with individual liberty or 
that interferes with liberty pursuant to a less controversial liberty-limiting 
principle, then that alternative must be adopted. 
5.  Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Very Probably 
Be an Effective Means for Achieving Its Objective 
The foregoing four conditions demand both that the end or objective of 
the strong hard paternalism is legitimate and that it cannot be achieved 
through morally preferable (non-strong paternalistic) alternatives.  The 
fifth necessary condition focuses on the particular methods or means of 
liberty limitation used.  The fifth condition requires that the strong hard 
paternalistic intervention very probably be an effective means for 
achieving the objective (i.e., protecting the subject from significant 
harm).113  In short, strong hard paternalism must “have a reasonable 
prospect of achievement.”114 
Unless there is a tight causal connection between the objective of the 
strong hard paternalistic intervention and the intervention itself, the 
intervention will be pointless.  Why interfere with individual liberty when 
doing so will not even achieve the benevolent objective?  It is this intuition 
that explains the failure of the New York City Big Gulp container size 
limits.115   
As Friedman observes, the evidence “did not support the notion that 
this regulation would have any concrete effect.”116   
6.  Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Protect the 
Subject from Harm that Outweighs Any Harm Caused by the 
Intervention Itself 
Even if the foregoing five conditions are satisfied, we must still ensure 
that strong hard paternalism will not cause more harm than it prevents.  
The sixth necessary condition for justified strong hard paternalism requires 
                                                                                                                          
113 Id. at 378–83. 
114 Id. at 378.  
115 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681, 701 (2014) (enjoining enforcement of the rule and holding that the 
Board of Health had exceeded its authority in promulgating it).  But see Marcello, supra note 73, at 
845–46 (arguing that “[t]he regulation’s alleged ‘loopholes’ [were] reasonable” as they, for example, 
allowed consumers to buy drinks that were not “devoid of nutritional value” in containers larger than 
sixteen ounces). 
116 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1739.  While Friedman considers the large soda ban to be soft 
paternalism, see id. at 1740, it could easily be characterized as hard paternalism.  While the New York 
City regulation did not ban any and all “consumption of sugary drinks,” it did ban a discrete product.  
See id. (noting that the container size, rather than the drink itself, was limited). 
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that the significant harm that the agent intends to reduce or prevent through 
limiting the subject’s liberty be greater than the harm caused by the liberty 
limitation itself.117   
In other words, not only must agents intervene for hard paternalistic 
reasons only to save the subject from significant harm, but agents must 
also intervene for hard paternalistic reasons only where they can probably 
prevent more harm than they themselves cause. 
7.  Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Be as Least 
Restrictive as Necessary. 
We saw that hard paternalism should be the operative liberty limiting 
principle only when no other alternative is available (per the fourth 
condition).118  But this is not enough.  Even when strong hard paternalism 
is justified on the other six conditions, the scope of the strong hard 
paternalistic intervention must be as narrow as possible, commensurate 
with achieving the primary objective of the liberty limitation.   
The seventh necessary condition for justified hard paternalism requires 
that the agent interfere with the subject’s liberty no more than is required 
to achieve the objective.119  The presumption against interference with 
individual liberty demands not only strong moral reasons for strong hard 
paternalism (conditions one to six) but also demands that the particular 
means, methods, and scope of strong hard paternalism be necessary.120 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The public health challenges that we face are enormous.  Regulators 
have a broad array of legal tools to address these challenges.121  But, 
increasingly, the required regulatory tools are (and must be) hard 
paternalistic.  
Professor Friedman argues that, while efficacious, most hard 
paternalistic regulation is impractical and unacceptable.  In contrast, I have 
demonstrated that there are wider opportunities for hard paternalism.  My 
promising conclusion is that regulators can have their cake and eat it too.  
They must simply ensure that they enact only those hard paternalistic 
measures that are weak or justified strong. 
                                                                                                                          
117 See Pope, supra note 102, at 385–87 (explaining the concept of proportionality and focusing 
on the need to “avoid solutions that are worse than the problem”). 
118 See supra text accompanying note 112; see also Pope, supra note 102, at 368 (noting that 
“justified hard paternalism requires that the agent intervene . . . only where no morally preferable, less 
autonomy restrictive alternatives are available”). 
119 See Pope, supra note 102, at 389–400 (describing the presumption against interference with 
individual liberty and the requirement that “hard paternalism . . . employ the least restrictive 
alternative”). 
120 Id. at 396. 
121 See supra note 2. 
